Does Industrial Safety Need Compliance—or Vision?
DISH—the Directorate of Industrial Safety and Health—needs leadership with a broad, technically sound and forward-looking vision.
Industrial safety cannot be improved by concentrating only on a few centrally controlled activities such as CO₂ flooding systems, fall-protection systems, emergency lighting or selected compliance audits involving a limited group of individuals. These measures are important, but they represent only a small part of an effective industrial-safety framework.
A strong safety culture requires long-term planning, competent inspections, continuous training, capacity building, transparent technical guidance and consistent enforcement across all sectors. It requires leadership that understands the complete risk profile of an industry rather than focusing only on selected compliance points.
The real purpose of industrial safety should be centred on three fundamental objectives:
- Protecting life
- Protecting the environment
- Protecting the facility and continuity of operations
The quality of industry will improve only when organisations and authorities move beyond a checklist-based approach and genuinely focus on these three outcomes. Compliance should be the minimum requirement—not the final objective.
There is also a growing concern within industry that some decisions appear to focus more on approvals, commercial interests or control over selected activities than on practical risk reduction. Whether or not this perception is fully accurate, it must be addressed through transparent procedures, clearly defined competency requirements and technically justified decision-making.
Authorities should certainly remain involved. However, their role should be to ask the right questions, define the information required in safety reports, establish transparent evaluation criteria and hold consultants accountable for the accuracy and quality of their assessments. Consultants should be required to inspect, verify, document and take professional responsibility for their conclusions. This would reduce malpractice far more effectively than relying only on an approval or empanelment system.
As a consultant, I repeatedly face one common question: “Are you approved or certified by the authority?”
My response is straightforward. I am an NFPA-certified fire specialist, certified in NFPA 101 Life Safety Code, have worked as a national and international consultant for nine consecutive years, and possess more than 20 years of industrial experience. Despite these qualifications, being expected to obtain separate approval from a legal authority merely to establish professional capability raises an important question: Should technical competence be determined by transparent qualifications, experience and accountability—or only by inclusion on an approved list?
The concern is not that authorities should have no role. The concern is whether requiring an “approved consultant” is justified when the approval process, competency criteria, technical evaluation and accountability mechanisms may not be sufficiently transparent.
Industry often fears regulatory authorities, and that fear can create an environment in which organisations feel compelled to satisfy demands without questioning whether those demands are technically justified or legally required. Industry must understand that when it has complied with the law, followed sound engineering practice and maintained credible evidence, it should be prepared to stand firmly on facts.
Officials, consultants and industry leaders must recognise that weak safety governance can ultimately affect everyone. Industrial accidents do not distinguish between workers, managers, consultants, regulators or surrounding communities.
The question that deserves serious discussion is:
Is it justified for DISH or any other authority to insist on an “approved consultant,” or would industrial safety improve more through transparent competency criteria, defined reporting requirements, independent technical verification and professional accountability?
We should reconsider the root cause. What approach will actually prevent accidents, improve safety performance and protect life, the environment and industrial assets?
That is the discussion the industrial safety system needs.
